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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
convenience of base ball fans and if an elaborate checking system were used it
would defeat the very purpose of the lot. Thompson v. Mobile Light & Ry.,
211 Ala. 525, 101 So. 177 (1924). In cases where a parking lot operator is forced
to assume the responsibility of a bailee for hire the fee is usually larger, and
the control of the car is turned over to the bailee who reserves the right to
move the cars. Such a case is Galowitz v. Magner, 208 App. Div. 6, 203 N.Y.
Supp. 421 (1924) where a fee of fifty cents was charged and the car was kept
within an eight-foot wall with an attendant on duty at all times. Here the limi-
tation printed on claim check was ineffective. A limitation saying that the lot
was open only between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m. was also ineffective where the bailor
was in the habit of coming much later and never being charged extra. A fee
of twenty-five cents was charged and two people were on duty after 5 p.m.
General Exchange Ins. Corp. v. Service Parking Grounds, 254 Mich. 1, 235
N.W. 898 (1931). Where the car owner paid thirty-five cents and received a
ticket on which was printed " . . . the fee is for the privilege of parking" and
no responsibility was "assumed" by the lot owner, the courts decided that since
the keys were left in the car it was a bailment and as such the lot operator was
prima facie responsible. Baione v. Heavey, 163 Pa. Super. 529, 158 Atl. 181
(1932). In Keenan Hotel v. Funk, 93 Ind. App. 677, 177 N.E. 364 (1931) a limi-
tation of "Not responsible for fire, accident, or theft" was held ineffective
where such injury was due to the negligence of the lot operator. The fee charged
was twenty-five cents.
Roy C. PACKLER
MASTER AND SERVANT-STATUTORY REGULATION OF OPTOMETRY-EMPLOYER AND
EMPLOYEE BOTH SUBJECT TO REGULATION.-The defendant, a firm of opticians not
registered as optometrists or as physicians, employed a physician duly registered
under the law of the commonwealth as such, at a fixed weekly salary, to make
free prescriptions for the purchasers of eyeglasses. The other employees of the
defendant assisted the purchasers in selecting the shape and the style of the
frames desired, ground and fitted the lenses in accordance with the prescriptions
of the physician. The purchasers paid nothing except a fixed price for the eye-
glasses, which price was identical whether the purchasers furnished their own
prescriptions, or procured them from the physician employed by the defendant.
The plaintiff brought the bill to restrain the defendant from practicing optometry
without a license or being registered as required by law. The case was reported
to the Supreme Judicial Court upon agreed facts without decision. Held, a decree
is granted, restraining the defendant from practicing optometry, either personally
or by any servant or employee, unless and until, and then only to the extent
that, they shall become lawfully entitled to do so. A person, real or corporate,
who is inhibited from directly practicing a profession, because unlicensed to do
so, cannot indirectly engage in the practice of such profession by employing one
who is not inhibited from practicing the profession, because such one is licensed
to do so, except, however, where the statute affirmatively permits it. McMurdo v.
Getter, (Mass. 1937) 10 N.E. (2d) 139.
It is well established that no one can practice law unless he has assiduously
complied with all the conditions required by the statutes and the rules of the
courts. As the legal entity, the corporation cannot go to law school, pass a
bar examination, or in any way comply with the qualifications which necessitate
human attributes, it becomes only too patent that the corporation cannot practice
law. Since it cannot practice directly, it cannot do so indirectly by employing
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competent lawyers to act for it. Such an evasion of the law by unlicensed indi-
viduals or corporations, if permitted, would be to render the laws of no effect.
Matter of Maclub of America, Inc., (Mass. 1936) 3 N.E. (2d) 272; In re Coop-
erative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910); In re Otterness, 181 Minn.
254, 232 N.W. 318 (1930). There is, however, no objection to hiring an attorney
on a salary basis by banks, corporations, firms, or individuals to attend to and
conduct its or their legal business. In re Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, 232 N.W. 318
(1930). A licensed dentist who knowingly works for an unlicensed person, real
or corporate, is guilty of aiding and abetting another to practice the profession
of dentistry without a license, for which offence his license is subject to revoca-
tion. Winslow v. Kansas State Board of Dental Examiners, 115 Kan. 4 5%, 23
Pac. 308 (1924); State Board of Dental Examiners v. Savelle, 90 Colo. 177, 8 P.
(2d) 693 (1932); State Board of Dental Examiners v. Miller, 90 Colo. 193, 8 P.
(2d) 699 (1932); People ex rel. Mahurin v. State Board of Dental Examiners,
85 Colo. 321, 275 Pac. 933 (1929). Such duties as do not call for any of the
professional skill required of a dentist, but rather require the skill of one trained
in business transactions, can be performed by a corporation or unlicensed person.
This is tantamount to holding that the business side of dentistry can be made
separate and distinct from the practice side; that, therefore, the business side
can be vested in an unlicensed person, real or corporate, that he only need
be licensed who must possess the professional skill required by the practice side.
Messner v. Board of Dental Examiners, 87 Cal. App. 199, 262 Pac. 58 (1927).
The practice of dentistry cannot be divided into the purely business side and
the practice side, as they are so inextricably bound together as to make separa-
tion impossible. If the suggested division be posible, then the proprietor of the
business side could be guilty of gross misconduct in its management, he could
violate all the standards which a licensed dentist would be required to respect
and stand immune and exempt from any regulatory supervision whatsoever. The
regulatory legislative acts have been passed for public protection and they cannot
be defeated by circumvention or subterfuge by devious and circuitous methods.
Rust v. State Board of Dental Examiners, 216 Wis. 127, 256 N.W. 919 (1934);
State v. Bailey Dental Co., 211 Iowa 781, 234 N.W. 260 (1931); People v. Pain-
less Parker Dentist, 85 Colo. 304, 275 Pac. 928 (1929) ; Parker v. Board of Den-
tal Examiners, 216 Cal. 285, 14 P. (2d) 67 (1932). The mere ownership of
dental equipment or dental offices is not in itself indicia of illegal practice; the
use to which these are put however is. Parker v. Board of Dental Examiners,
216 Cal. 285, 14 P. (2d) 67 (1932).
In Stern v. Flynn, 154 Misc. 609, 278 N.Y. Supp. 598 (1935), the petitioner
offered for filing a certificate which stated, in substance, among other things,
that it was organized to perform optometrical work which was to be done by
licensed optometrists and physicians in its employ. The court upheld the officer.
Before one can carry on a profession, he must meet the requirements as laid
down by the statutes. These requirements can only be met by real persons and
not by legal entities. Persons who cannot ordinarily practice as individuals
should not be allowed to do so under the guise of a ckbrporation, to allow such
circumvention would be to render nugatory the regulatory legislation designed
to protect the public against ignorant, unqualified, and unscrupulous individuals.
Funk Jewelry Co. v. State ex rel. La Prade, 46 Ariz. 348, 50 P. (2d) 945 (1935)
is to the same effect. Opticians, who employ licensed optometrists and physicians
on a salary or some other basis, to make prescriptions for customers with whom
the opticians have contracted, will be deemed to be practicing optometry even
though they effect a lease to the optometrists of the office and optometrical
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equipment, such lease being but a sham, for it appears only too obviously that
the opticians retain, directly or indirectly, such control over the optometrists or
physicians who are their employees as to render the lease of no effect. State of
Kansas ex rel. Clarence Beck v. Goldman Jewelry Co., 142 Kan. 881, 51 P. (2d)
995 (1935) ; Eisensmith v. Buhl Optical Co., 115 W. Va. 776, 178 S.E. 695 (1935) ;
State v. Kindy Optical Co., 216 Iowa 1157, 248 N.W. 332 (1933). However, in
Jaeckle v. L. Ba-mberger Co., 119 N.J. Eq. 126, 181 Atl. 181 (1935), a corpora-
tion, owning a department store in which it conducted an optical department
managed by a licensed optometrist, was said not to be practicing optometry
without a license as the statute only aims to protect the public by requiring
those who actually test the eyes to be properly qualified. That it is immaterial
whether the employer is skilled in the art. The court took the view that optom-
etry is divisible into the business and practice sides and that the one conducting
the business side need not meet the requirements necessary for a license. In
Wisconsin no case can be found squarely on point. However, in an opinion by
the Attorney General the view is expressed that optometry is not subject to
division into the business and practice sides, and that, therefore, a corporation
or unlicensed person by conducting the purely business side is in fact practicing
optometry without a license. 24 Op. Atty. Gen. 472 (Wis. 1935).
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